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To the Editors (Jeffrey S. Lantis writes):
Keir Lieber and Daryl Press’s recent article presents a compelling case for the rise of
U.S. nuclear primacy in the twenty-ªrst century. The authors, however, fail to address
what they maintain is a central question in international relations scholarship: “Does
nuclear primacy grant the superior side real coercive leverage in political disputes?”1
Their passing discussion of the theme does little justice to the merit of the question, and
as a result the article seems incomplete. In fact, the United States already enjoys pri-
macy in the vast majority of its relations with other countries, but recent events suggest
that this preponderance of power has not led to coercive leverage.
Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, nuclear primacy may cast a very
short shadow on global politics. Evidence for this argument can be found in great
power relations (characterized by Lieber and Press as near primacy) and in U.S. deal-
ings with other states (true primacy). For example, the United States has gained little
leverage against China and Russia even though it sits on the “cusp of nuclear primacy”
today (p. 8). A 2006 Pentagon report warns of changes in China’s conventional strategy
designed to shape its military into a “more modern force capable of ªghting short-
duration, high-intensity conºicts against high-tech adversaries.”2 Meanwhile, Russia is
pursuing a war on insurgents in its periphery and has even used its energy supplies as
a weapon against its neighbors. The U.S. inability both to slow China’s military mod-
ernization and its aggressive rhetoric toward Taiwan and to constrain Vladimir Putin’s
increasingly authoritarian turn in Russia, as well as the United States’ failure to bring
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China and Russia on board to halt the pace of nuclear proliferation in Iran, are but a
few examples of the limits of near primacy today.
There are no clearer cases of the short shadow of primacy than in U.S. dealings with
“axis of evil” nations since 2001. The United States enjoys true primacy in relation to
these countries, yet in a real sense seems unable to prevent them from developing
weapons of mass destruction. The Iraq case illustrates this dilemma. Even though the
Iraqi regime abandoned its drive for weapons of mass destruction in the decade after
the 1991 Persian Gulf War, Saddam Hussein sought to maintain the illusion that it had a
viable program. In the buildup to the 2003 Iraq war, no action by the United States or its
allies seemed to effectively convey the message that the coalition would strike to pre-
vent Iraqi rearmament. According to a report by the U.S. Joint Forces Command that
was declassiªed in February 2006, Hussein remained “very conªdent” in the months
before the war “that the United States would not dare attack Iraq, and that if it did, it
would be defeated.”3 Nuclear primacy granted essentially no leverage in this case, and
the United States is still paying the price for this breakdown in coercive diplomacy.
Iran and North Korea are moving forward with their nuclear programs in deªance of
international condemnation and threats.4 A secret Pentagon report leaked in April 2006
even suggested that U.S. military planners were considering the use of tactical nuclear
weapons to destroy Iranian facilities.5 These and other efforts to signal the Iranian re-
gime, however, have fallen on deaf ears. President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has cele-
brated scientiªc achievements in enrichment, boasted of the potential of Iran’s nuclear
programs, rejected international pressure to change course, and threatened to with-
draw from the nonproliferation regime altogether. In addition, after years of limited
progress in the six-party talks, the George W. Bush administration recently switched
gears to focus on a peace treaty for the Korean Peninsula as a step toward greater secu-
rity. If U.S. primacy cannot prevent rival nations from taking the ultimate decision to
develop nuclear arsenals of their own, then scholars must carefully reassess its utility
for international security in the twenty-ªrst century.
Exploring the limits of primacy requires a more detailed focus on the process by
which strategic decisions are formulated. If constructivist security studies have made
one signiªcant contribution to the ªeld in the past decade, it is in centering the dialogue
on the inºuence of key actors, ideas, and institutions. By ignoring ideational variables
in their article, Lieber and Press skirt a fundamental truth: elites are instrumental in
deªning security policy goals as well as the means to achieve them.6 They do not pro-
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2006/ipp.pdf; and Kevin Woods, James Lacey, and Williamson Murray, “Saddam’s Delusions: The
View from the Inside,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 85, No. 3 (May/June 2006), p. 3.
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6. The authors leave little room in their analysis for the role of individual leaders and
intentionality. Statements such as, “A preemptive strike on an alerted Russian arsenal would still
likely fail, but a surprise attack at peacetime alert levels would have a reasonable chance of suc-
cess,” are particular disconcerting. Lieber and Press, “The End of MAD?” p. 8. Key works that ad-
dress ideational variables in international security include Alexander Wendt, “Constructing
International Politics,” International Security, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Summer 1995), pp. 73–74; Alexander
vide sufªcient evidence that past U.S. leaders have actually sought nuclear primacy,
nor do they adequately characterize decisions taken by any governments as inherently
subjective responses to threat perceptions.7
The achievement of U.S. nuclear primacy is a function of complex circumstances, but
recent systematic and purposeful Bush administration decisions are an important part
of the story. The 2001 Nuclear Posture Review made clear the administration’s willing-
ness to launch preemptive strikes against potentially hostile states. This was followed
by decisions to abrogate the 1972 Antiballistic Missile Treaty with Russia and begin
construction of a national missile defense system. The administration recently unveiled
a new program to deploy an antimissile defense network in Europe, ostensibly to
thwart the challenge from Iran or other nations. Research and development initiatives
for mininukes and bunker busters, as well as revitalized programs for nuclear weapons
research and civilian energy production, conªrm the new direction in U.S. nuclear
strategy.8
The United States, however, has enjoyed very few beneªts of nuclear primacy in rela-
tion to lesser powers in the twenty-ªrst century, and it has failed in its bid to prevent
several states from developing nuclear weapons. Why has coercive diplomacy failed?
Why does the shadow of U.S. nuclear primacy appear so short in the twenty-ªrst cen-
tury? One avenue for exploration of these important questions lies in strategic cultural
studies of the concepts of deterrence, coercion, and dissuasion.9 Answers may also
emerge from contemporary scholarship on identity and strategic choice.10 Bruce
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Jentleson and Christopher Whytock’s excellent investigation of coercive diplomacy in
Libya is one such study that recognizes strategies as heavily dependent on context.11
In summary, Lieber and Press’s treatment of nuclear primacy remains surprisingly
incomplete. Only at the end of their piece do they begin the hard task of evaluating the
political effectiveness of nuclear primacy. Primacy and hegemony may be complemen-
tary, they argue, but a combination of primacy with “a more restrained foreign policy”
posture may lead to greater instability (p. 39). Unfortunately, these brief policy refer-
ences raise more questions than they answer, and the article represents only the begin-




To the Editors (Tom Sauer writes):
The U.S. nuclear weapons arsenal is, as Keir Lieber and Daryl Press’s recent article
notes, the most powerful in the world, a situation that is unlikely to change in the com-
ing years.1 Despite this gross imbalance, I argue that neither Russia nor China is likely
to undertake signiªcant countermeasures to help close this gap, for three reasons. First,
neither country feels directly threatened by U.S. nuclear primacy. Second, leaders in
Moscow and Beijing do not believe that the United States will use nuclear weapons
again. Third, Russia and China need only a minimum deterrent capability. In the con-
clusion of this letter, I suggest an alternative explanation for the United States’ pursuit
of nuclear primacy following the end of the Cold War.
no u.s. intention to attack great powers
Russia and China do not fear a U.S. nuclear strike for the same reason they have chosen
not to balance against the United States: they do not regard it as an expansionist state,
especially vis-à-vis other great powers. Even the neorealist John Mearsheimer argues
that the United States is essentially a status quo power that poses little danger to the
survival or sovereignty of other great powers.2 Although in an earlier article Lieber and
Gerard Alexander single out China as the most likely candidate for balancing against
the United States, they also assert that “China’s defense buildup is not new, nor is it as
ambitious and assertive as it should be if the United States posed a direct threat that re-
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1. Keir A. Lieber and Daryl G. Press, “The End of MAD? The Nuclear Dimension of U.S. Primacy,”
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quired internal balancing.”3 Why? Because U.S. grand strategy “is not [perceived as]
broadly threatening.”4
the nuclear taboo
More than sixty years after Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the threat of using nuclear weap-
ons sounds hollow. It is highly unlikely that the United States or, for that matter, any
other state will use nuclear weapons in a conºict. Simply put, no military rationale ex-
ists for using nuclear weapons; this is especially true for the United States, which also
maintains the world’s largest conventional weapons arsenal. The use of such weapons
would obliterate the nuclear taboo, the norm that holds that using weapons with such
sheer destructive capacity is immoral.5 Nuclear weapons do not distinguish between ci-
vilians and soldiers, which is hard to square with the ethical rules of modern warfare.
Given the nonuse of nuclear weapons over the last several decades, including during
the Vietnam War, the taboo against their use has only strengthened. And as the concept
of nuclear deterrence becomes less credible, nuclear weapons become more irrelevant,
at least with respect to state actors.
Lieber and Press acknowledge the existence of the nuclear taboo, but they argue that
it does not inºuence Russian and Chinese thinking and behavior. I ªnd no reason, how-
ever, why the taboo would not apply to both countries. Does the current generation of
Russian and Chinese decisionmakers have such low moral standards that they are pre-
pared to slaughter tens or hundreds of thousands of foreigners in a single strike, and at
the same time risk a military response that could kill even more of their own citizens?
In addition, Lieber and Press question the strength of the nuclear taboo more
broadly, pointing to comments by former Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, who
is generally considered a strong critic of the use of nuclear weapons.6 The authors cite
recently declassiªed documents to suggest that McNamara would have supported the
use of nuclear weapons against China in the event of a Chinese attack against India in
1963, as opposed to the introduction of a large number of U.S. troops. This does not
mean, however, that McNamara actively advocated the use of nuclear weapons. Rather,
he was assessing two different military options. In January of the same year,
McNamara stated before a congressional hearing, “Nuclear weapons, even in the lower
kiloton range, are extremely destructive devices. . . . Furthermore, while it does not nec-
essarily follow that the use of tactical nuclear weapons must inevitably escalate into
global nuclear war, it does present a very deªnite threshold, beyond which we enter a
vast unknown.”7 That McNamara never recommended the use of nuclear weapons
later, during the Vietnam War, supports his skepticism of their usefulness.
More fundamentally, the nuclear taboo has grown stronger over time. In the spring
of 2006, the White House questioned the idea of the Joint Chiefs of Staff not to consider
the use of nuclear weapons in the event of a U.S. attack against Iranian nuclear weap-
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ons facilities. Indeed, rumors circulated that high-level military ofªcers even threatened
to resign if such an option were contemplated.8 A similar exchange occurred during
preparations for the 1991 Persian Gulf War. When Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney
asked Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell about the United States’ nu-
clear options, Powell refused even to consider the idea.9 When Vice President Dan
Quayle was asked at a press conference in early February 1991 (i.e., during the Persian
Gulf War) whether President George H.W. Bush had considered introducing nuclear
weapons, he answered: “I just can’t imagine President Bush making the decision to use
chemical or nuclear weapons under any circumstances.”10
Finally, Lieber and Press rightly argue that a nuclear taboo does not prevent the use
of nuclear weapons. The point, however, is that the taboo makes such use considerably
less likely, reduces the credibility of nuclear deterrence, and relegates nuclear primacy
to irrelevancy.
minimum deterrence
In 1974 Secretary of State Henry Kissinger questioned the principle of nuclear superior-
ity: “What in the name of God is strategic superiority? What is the signiªcance of it, po-
litically, militarily, operationally, at these levels of numbers? What do you do with it?”11
Even in the extremely unlikely event the United States uses nuclear weapons against
Russia or China, whether either country can retaliate with one, ªve, ten, or a hundred
nuclear weapons does not really matter for deterrence calculations. As advocates of
minimum deterrence (like myself) argue, one accurate and invulnerable nuclear
weapon is sufªcient as a second-strike force. I can hardly imagine an attack against vi-
tal U.S. interests in the foreseeable future destructive enough to risk an assured nuclear
response and the annihilation of one major U.S. city. Thus, the size of the nuclear arse-
nal does not matter, unless one believes that the United States can engage in a pro-
longed nuclear war and emerge victorious.12
Because a minimum deterrent is sufªcient, Russia and China need not worry greatly
about the exact nature of the United States’ nuclear posture. In practice, China can ap-
parently live with the tremendous nuclear imbalance that has existed since the mid-
1960s. It currently possesses 80–130 nuclear weapons, of which only 30 could be used
on an intercontinental scale.13 Because of a lack of resources, Russia may have to pursue
a similar course over time. In addition, some U.S. experts have argued that the security
of the United States would be enhanced with a much smaller nuclear arsenal.14 A deci-
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sion to shrink the U.S. arsenal would also strengthen the nuclear nonproliferation
regime at a time when many observers believe that it is on the verge of collapse.15
bureaucratic politics and the lack of political leadership
Lieber and Press write, “[The] steady improvement in the U.S. nuclear arsenal is en-
tirely consistent with America’s across-the-board effort to maintain and expand its mili-
tary primacy” (p. 31). In other words, political decisionmakers in Washington have
deliberately chosen to follow the road to nuclear primacy, thus making it a rational
choice. This claim, however, is highly debatable. If the major objective is nuclear pri-
macy, why is the United States helping Russia safeguard its nuclear weapons complex?
And even more surprising, why did the George W. Bush administration propose to col-
laborate with Russia on missile defense?
There is a simple, more convincing explanation for the United States’ pursuit of
continued nuclear primacy—namely, bureaucratic politics and the lack of political lead-
ership, which also explain the irrational overkill capacity developed by both super-
powers during the Cold War.16 The U.S. and Soviet nuclear weapons establishments
were massive during this period, employing hundreds of thousands of workers. After
the Cold War, U.S. nuclear weapons laboratories (Lawrence Livermore, Los Alamos,
and Sandia) that are part of the Department of Energy and the Strategic Air Command
under the Department of Defense strove to remain relevant. Although downsizing did
occur, the U.S. nuclear weapons community did more than just survive. By the end of
the 1990s, the annual nuclear weapons budget in absolute terms was still more than $30
billion. The yearly budget of the nuclear weapons laboratories grew from $4 billion to
$6.4 billion in the second half of the 1990s. Paradoxically, this ªgure was higher than
during the Cold War, due to the Stockpile Stewardship Program that had been agreed
with the nuclear weapons establishment in exchange for its endorsement of the Com-
prehensive Test Ban Treaty in 1996.
The 1993–94 Nuclear Posture Review offers the clearest indication of bureaucratic re-
sistance and the lack of political leadership on the nuclear weapons issue. At that time,
U.S. Secretary of Defense Les Aspin clearly intended to adapt U.S. nuclear weapons
policy to the changed circumstances produced by the end of the Cold War and to dras-
tically cut the U.S. arsenal. Midlevel ofªcials in the Department of Defense, however,
failed to provide Aspin with proposals on how to accomplish these objectives. After
Aspin resigned in December 1993, his equally determined assistant secretary of defense
for international security policy, Ashton Carter, tried to push through Aspin’s nuclear
agenda but failed as well. Midlevel military and civilian ofªcials in the Department of
Defense, supported by members of Congress, succeeded in resisting any change in U.S.
nuclear weapons policy. Responsibility for their success—and for U.S. nuclear primacy
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today—rests with William Perry, Aspin’s successor, and his deputy, John Deutch, as
well as with President Bill Clinton and his National Security Council staff. Their unwill-
ingness to support Aspin’s and Carter’s efforts was, in the words of former Secretary of
Defense McNamara, a “real disgrace.”17 That U.S. nuclear primacy results from bureau-
cratic politics and not from a rational decisionmaking process is an additional reason




To the Editors (James J. Wirtz writes):
Crisis stability is an issue that has received little attention since the end of the Cold War.
The reduction in the number, capability, and alert levels of U.S. and Russian nuclear
forces might call into question one side or the other’s secure second-strike capability, al-
though generally benign U.S.-Russian relations reduce the salience of these “hypotheti-
cal” or “technical” concerns about the nuclear balance.1 The possibility that Washington
or Moscow has a ºeeting opportunity to disarm the other side by being ªrst to use nu-
clear weapons might become apparent during a crisis as preventive motivations for
war peak. Nevertheless, worries about crisis instability based on increasingly far-
fetched scenarios lack the traction needed to stop the U.S. nuclear drawdown or to re-
start the U.S. nuclear force modernization programs that were canceled by the George
H.W. Bush administration in the early 1990s. In just six short years, when the Moscow
Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions takes effect, the United States and Russia will
have reduced the size of their strategic nuclear arsenals by approximately 16,000 de-
ployed warheads, or about 80 percent of the force they ªelded in the late 1980s.
Keir Lieber and Daryl Press should be commended for raising issues of crisis stabil-
ity that are inherent in the reduction of U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear forces.2 As
they note in their article, theorists credit the situation of mutual assured destruction,
which is based on mutual second-strike capabilities, not nuclear weapons per se, with
helping to keep the Cold War cold.3 The effort to preserve a secure second-strike capa-
bility at increasingly lower force levels, however, is no small task, especially as govern-
ments keep a shrinking percentage of their nuclear forces on “day alert” to save on
operations and maintenance costs. Mobile missiles kept in garrison or nuclear weapons
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stored in a few heavily guarded depots for safekeeping against terrorism or theft are
more vulnerable to strategic attack than are dispersed forces. Almost by deªnition, in-
tercontinental ballistic missiles “de-targeted” to prevent catastrophic accidents might
not be able to be launched on warning or launched while under attack, leaving them
potentially vulnerable to destruction in the event of a bolt-out-of-the-blue strike. Nev-
ertheless, Lieber and Press’s suggestion that the United States possesses a splendid
ªrst-strike capability against Russia offers a scenario that is not as risk free or cut and
dried as they imply. Below I raise several reservations about their ªndings.
Lieber and Press’s bolt-out-of-the-blue scenario is within the realm of possibility, but
it is not realistic. Surprise attacks sometimes occur and generally succeed, so there is al-
ways a chance that a nuclear-armed state could be caught napping.4 Government
ofªcials, military ofªcers, and the general public have an uncanny ability to ignore
what in hindsight are clear indicators of trouble.5 But a bolt-out-of-the-blue attack is un-
likely in the absence of signiªcant political motivation for undertaking such a risky act.
If a crisis increases the political salience of preemption, it is likely to generate pressures
on both sides to alert their forces, reducing the technical opportunity to launch a splen-
did ªrst strike. Modest, nonprovocative actions could greatly increase a state’s secure
second-strike capability; the availability of partial-alert measures such as moving a few
mobile missiles from garrison or putting submarines out to sea increases the probability
that some action will be taken in response to a warning. When the technical possibility
of launching a bolt-out-of-the-blue attack exists, policymakers will lack the political
motivation for rolling the dice. And during a crisis when preemption appears politi-
cally tempting, the likelihood that both sides would alert their forces eliminates the
technical opportunity to disarm the opponent. It is difªcult to escape the conclusion
that the scenario identiªed by Lieber and Press might occur, but that the problem they
identify is not especially signiªcant.
This observation still leaves open the possibility that U.S. policymakers might order
an attack to disarm Russians simply because it appears as if they can. A bolt-out-of-the-
blue attack, however, would remain unlikely because even a remote possibility of retal-
iation is likely to deter all but the most risk-acceptant individuals. U.S. policymakers
are not going to launch a preventive war because they are enticed by the fact that a de-
teriorating Russian day-alert posture creates a higher probability of launching a splen-
did ªrst strike. Instead, they will more likely be deterred by the lingering probability
that a few (dozen, score, hundred?) nuclear weapons might land on major U.S. urban-
industrial centers. Deterrence works not only because the United States military can
kill some Russians, but also because of the fear that in a nuclear war, Russia might de-
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stroy some U.S. countervalue targets. Of course, the only way to win a nuclear war is
by ªring ªrst, and it would be preferable to destroy all of your opponent’s nuclear
forces before they can be used against you. But U.S. and Russian policymakers are more
likely to be terriªed by the prospect of even a couple of nuclear weapons ªred in retali-
ation than energized by the opportunity to attempt to catch the opponent napping.
The analytical excursion offered by Lieber and Press, however, sidesteps the entire is-
sue of retaliation and deterrence. Because the results of the stochastic analytical tech-
niques the authors employ are largely driven by the assumptions that guide their
analysis, the U.S. policymakers in their scenario need not fear Russian retaliation. The
assumptions that the United States is able to catch the Russians in a extremely weak
day-alert position—with their submarines in port, bombers concentrated on a few run-
ways, and their mobile missiles in garrison, while launching a fully generated nuclear
force undetected by either Russian early warning systems or overhead and human sur-
veillance of the United States—determine the outcome of the exchange. By assuming
that “Russia is unable to launch its missiles before the ªrst wave of U.S. warheads ar-
rives on target” (p. 19), or that “the Russian early warning system would probably not
give Russia’s leaders the time they need to retaliate” (p. 22), one grants the United
States a splendid ªrst-strike capability before even beginning the analysis. Given the as-
sumptions that drive Lieber and Press’s nuclear exchange, the outcome enjoyed by the
United States would be no different than if the Russians lacked a nuclear arsenal: in
both situations, the United States could destroy or threaten to destroy Russia with no
fear of retaliation.6 This result does not correspond to reality because so long as a state
possesses a nuclear arsenal, there is always a possibility—however remote—that nu-
clear retaliation might occur following a nearly splendid ªrst strike.7
Because policymakers can never ignore even the remotest possibility of retaliation,
U.S. ofªcials would have to possess nerves of steel or brains of lead to undertake an at-
tack on Russia based on the assumptions that guide Lieber and Press’s analysis. An as-
sessment of ªrst-strike prospects should not rest on the idea that U.S. strategy and
weapons will work perfectly and that the opponent will not receive or execute orders to
retaliate. The hypothetical attack described by Lieber and Press is too serious a matter
to be based on these kinds of assumptions. For instance, in an analysis of a “limited”
U.S. nuclear strike against Soviet strategic forces involving 1,740 aimpoints and 4,108
attacking nuclear warheads, Barbara Levi, Frank von Hippel, and William Daugherty
estimated that 25 million to 54 million Soviets might be killed or injured by the immedi-
ate effects of such an attack.8 Lieber and Press’s scenario involves only 799 targets and
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2,890 nuclear weapons (p. 20), so the Russian casualties suffered in the attack would
probably be near the low end of this earlier casualty estimate, or about the same num-
ber of casualties suffered by the Soviet Union in World War II. And if one reintroduces
the prospect of retaliation into the scenario, one discovers something more than the nu-
clear taboo to restrain the United States. Daugherty, Levi, and von Hippel estimated
that if the Soviets retaliated using 100 one-megaton nuclear warheads against U.S. ur-
ban areas in a way optimized to inºict the greatest number of casualties, they could
promptly cause somewhere between 25 million and 66 million deaths, a high price to
pay to reduce casualties from a potential Russian nuclear attack.9 If the Russians were
deterred from launching a concerted countervalue attack with their remaining forces,
they might instead launch a series of attacks against the conventional military facilities
of the United States and its allies to blunt a possible U.S. effort to exploit its moment of
nuclear primacy. Even if the scenario described by Lieber and Press unfolds as adver-
tised, the Russians could still deliver hundreds of tactical nuclear weapons against mili-
tary bases, weapons storage facilities, command and control centers, ports, and critical
transportation hubs using conventional (tactical aircraft operating on one-way missions
if necessary) and unconventional methods of delivery. Given the high population den-
sities and proximity of urban areas to military facilities in Japan and Europe, millions in
countries the United States considers allies could die in this nuclear exchange.
There is a ªnal irony embodied in Lieber and Press’s scenario. It is not exactly clear
what the United States would gain by eliminating Russia’s strategic nuclear forces in a
splendid ªrst strike. Ignoring for the moment that U.S. ofªcials might get their “hair
mussed” if the Russians managed to retaliate with a few nuclear weapons, expending
virtually the entire U.S. strategic arsenal in an all-out attack against Russia might place
the United States behind Great Britain, France, China, or even Israel in the nuclear
pecking order. The attack they posit prima facie would cost the United States its posi-
tion of nuclear primacy. The attack also would leave the United States in a vulnerable
position as it regenerated and reconstituted its nuclear forces. Would the United States’
new peer competitors be seduced by the same logic that animates the U.S. policy-
makers in Lieber and Press’s scenario and destroy U.S. ballistic missile submarines as
they return to port or attack the U.S. nuclear infrastructure in a collective or individual
bid to achieve nuclear primacy?
Extending Lieber and Press’s scenario thus highlights an interesting facet of the nu-
clear balance. As U.S. nuclear force levels diminish, nuclear primacy is increasingly a
chimera, because the effort to knock out one’s nearest nuclear competitor almost guar-
antees a second-class nuclear status and the emergence of a window of vulnerability as
nuclear forces are reconstituted and regenerated following a splendid ªrst strike. The
need to take into account the behavior of several nuclear-armed states will only in-
crease in the future as U.S. nuclear force reductions continue. As Russian and U.S. nu-
clear forces reach Moscow Treaty levels, the need to regenerate and reconstitute nuclear
forces following a splendid U.S. ªrst strike against a relatively smaller Chinese nuclear
force, for example, could leave the United States open to coercion or attack from Russia
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or other smaller nuclear competitors. Given the variety of dynamics that might animate
multipolar nuclear relationships, it might be time to explore the nature and points of





Our recent article, “The End of MAD? The Nuclear Dimension of U.S. Primacy,” made
three principal arguments.1 First, the strategic nuclear balance has shifted so dramati-
cally since the end of the Cold War that the United States stands on the cusp of nuclear
primacy, meaning that it could conceivably conduct a successful nuclear disarming
strike against any major power adversary. Second, U.S. nuclear primacy stems from the
steep decline of the Russian arsenal, the slow modernization of the Chinese arsenal,
and the steady growth of U.S. nuclear counterforce capabilities. Third, the trajectory of
nuclear developments indicates that the balance will shift further in favor of the United
States in the coming years.
We appreciate the thoughtful responses to our article by Jeffrey Lantis, Tom Sauer,
and James Wirtz. Their letters do not challenge our central empirical claims; none of the
authors question our ªnding that the United States could carry out a disarming ªrst
strike. Instead, all three responses focus on the implications of U.S. nuclear primacy for
international politics. This is the debate we hoped to trigger.
Below we highlight the four broad questions raised by Lantis, Sauer, and Wirtz about
the implications of nuclear primacy. Our views on these issues differ signiªcantly from
those of our critics. But more important, we believe that these questions demand much
greater attention than they have received from international relations scholars in recent
years. The answers reveal much about the nature of great power relations in the
twenty-ªrst century and the likely role of nuclear weapons in future crises and wars.
how will russia and china respond to u.s nuclear primacy?
The ªrst major question concerns how Russia and China will react to their growing
strategic nuclear vulnerability. In “The End of MAD?” we argued that efforts to up-
grade the United States’ nuclear counterforce capabilities may pressure Russia and
China to increase and modernize their arsenals and raise the day-to-day readiness of
their nuclear forces. Sauer and Wirtz disagree. They argue that Russia and China will
not worry about their growing vulnerability. Sauer claims that leaders in Moscow and
Beijing recognize that the United States is a status quo power and thus not a threat. He
also argues that Russian and Chinese concerns are soothed by their conªdence in the
nuclear taboo. Wirtz argues that Russia will not feel vulnerable because it can greatly
complicate a U.S. counterforce attack by alerting and dispersing its force if U.S.-Russian
relations deteriorate.
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threat assessment. We are skeptical of Sauer’s claim that Russia and China trust
the United States or care little about their increased strategic vulnerability. Leaders in
Moscow have noticed the expansion of U.S. counterforce capabilities and have reacted
angrily. Russian President Vladimir Putin recently vowed to increase defense spending
to check U.S. nuclear primacy.2 In a separate statement, he complained about U.S. plans
for “a whole arsenal of destabilizing weapons,” referring speciªcally to weapons that
could target Russia’s diminished nuclear arsenal.3 Two other senior Russian ofªcials
have pointed to U.S. missile defenses as proof that the United States intends to neutral-
ize Russia’s nuclear forces, and Russian Minister of Defense Sergei Ivanov has sug-
gested that Russia unilaterally withdraw from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces
Treaty. Other Russian ofªcials have called for increasing the rate of production of Rus-
sia’s newest intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs).4 Former Russian Prime Minister
Yegor Gaidar predicts that Russian concerns about U.S. nuclear primacy will trigger in-
creased spending on Russia’s nuclear forces.5
The notion that China trusts the United States—and will therefore acquiesce to U.S.
nuclear primacy—is even less plausible. There are powerful reasons to expect serious
friction between the United States and China in the future. Even if Chinese leaders
view the United States as a status quo country, as Sauer suggests, China’s rising eco-
nomic power may put Washington and Beijing on a collision course; in fact, changes in
the global distribution of power often trigger antagonism between status quo countries
and rising challengers.6 The U.S. government is aware of these dangers and has de-
clared that U.S. policy is “to dissuade potential adversaries”—a thinly veiled reference
to China—from “surpassing, or equaling, the power of the United States.”7 To make
matters worse, China has hostile relations with Japan, the United States’ key ally in the
region. In a decade or two, China may ªnd itself surrounded by an anti-China U.S. mil-
itary alliance. We see no reason to expect that Chinese leaders will overlook these dan-
gers and accept their country’s vast inferiority in conventional and nuclear forces.
No one knows for certain how China will respond to U.S. nuclear primacy. But to as-
sume that the United States can keep enhancing its counterforce capabilities without
triggering a nuclear buildup from China requires a considerable leap of faith.8
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the nuclear taboo. Sauer offers a second reason to believe that Russia and China
will accept their current vulnerability: the nuclear taboo. According to Sauer, policy-
makers in Moscow and Beijing understand that the United States has a powerful aver-
sion to using nuclear weapons. Knowing this, Russia and China have no reason to
build up their nuclear forces.
There are several reasons—from different theoretical perspectives—to doubt that
leaders in Moscow and Beijing will entrust their national security to the restraining
power of the nuclear taboo. A realist, for example, would scoff at the notion that Russia
or China will base its defense plans on the assumption that the United States is too
moral to be ruthless in war. The paramount goal of national survival greatly overshad-
ows leaders’ conªdence in the normative prohibitions constraining their adversaries.
Furthermore, even scholars who reject these realist arguments, and who believe that
norms and taboos signiªcantly constrain state behavior, should not draw the conclu-
sion that Sauer reaches. They, too, should expect that Russia and China will work hard
to reduce their vulnerability to a disarming attack. First, scholars of the nuclear taboo
are explicit that the taboo has not made the use of nuclear weapons impossible; rather it
has “decreased the likelihood that nuclear weapons will be used.”9 The seminal work
by Nina Tannenwald focuses on establishing that the nuclear taboo has constrained
U.S. behavior, but it never attempts to measure the power of that constraint. Her analy-
sis does not reveal whether the taboo reduces the probability of U.S. nuclear use by 20
percent or 80 percent, relative to what it would be without the taboo. Absent that criti-
cal data, there is no rational reason for leaders in Moscow or Beijing to base their coun-
tries’ security on the nuclear taboo.
Second, as the taboo literature acknowledges, countries (and individuals) violate ta-
boos when confronting particularly frightening circumstances. The September 11 terror-
ist attacks led the United States to violate existing taboos against torture for ªve years,
and only now is that practice being reined in. If the United States will violate taboos
when Americans feel angry and scared, why would Russian and Chinese leaders as-
sume that the taboo will protect their countries during a serious military crisis?
Finally, the taboo literature is explicit that taboos can change or disappear.
Tannenwald lists a set of trends that “could unravel” the nuclear taboo.10 What is strik-
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the world order . . . expressing active disdain for the UN and international treaties and advocating
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struction by other actors.” As Tannenwald recognizes, all but one of these factors are currently
ing is that every one of these trends is either happening or being considered. There is no
guarantee that the nuclear taboo will disappear, but why should we assume, as Sauer
does, that Russia and China will stake their national security on a malleable norm of
unknown power and longevity?
The history of the nuclear age supports our skepticism. The nuclear taboo did not al-
low the superpowers to stop worrying about a nuclear attack during the Cold War.
Scholars claim that the taboo became institutionalized within the U.S. government from
the 1960s to the 1980s. But this period directly coincides with the most intense nuclear
arms race in history, one in which both the United States and the Soviet Union de-
ployed enormous nuclear arsenals and paid great attention to their survivability. There
is no evidence that either superpower was willing to forgo building survivable deter-
rent forces and rely on the nuclear taboo instead. We see no reason to expect Russia or
China to behave differently today.
false vulnerability. Wirtz suggests that Russia has little reason to fear growing
U.S. counterforce capabilities. He notes that we model a surprise attack by the United
States against the Russian strategic arsenal at peacetime alert levels. Wirtz argues that
U.S. leaders would consider initiating a nuclear attack only if U.S.-Russian relations de-
teriorated into a crisis. In such a circumstance, Russia could alert its nuclear forces, thus
reducing its vulnerability to a U.S. ªrst strike. The implication is that Russia can live
with its current vulnerability until U.S.-Russian relations take a seriously troubling
turn.11
Although Russian leaders could choose to live with their peacetime vulnerability
and plan to bolster their deterrent only if relations with the United States deteriorated,
we doubt they will do this. Great powers do not typically leave their military forces
vulnerable to a surprise attack. Russia, the victim of a catastrophic surprise attack in
June 1941, is even less likely to do so. Thus far the reaction in Russia to increasing U.S.
counterforce capabilities—and to our article—suggests that the leadership is indeed
upset about its growing vulnerability.12
Furthermore, Russia would be wise to address its growing vulnerability soon, rather
than assume that it can protect itself by simply alerting its forces during a crisis. Al-
though Russia could currently reduce its vulnerability by sending a few submarines to
sea and dispersing its mobile ICBMs, in the future such steps may not be adequate. The
Russian force is eroding.13 Its ballistic missile submarines are poorly maintained and
they rarely patrol, so the crews are losing the skills needed to evade U.S. efforts to track
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them. At the same time, the United States is working to improve technology to
track submarines and detect mobile missile launchers. In a few years, Moscow may be
unable to protect its force by simply dispersing a few submarines and mobile missiles.
China faces even stronger incentives to respond to U.S. nuclear primacy. The Chinese
force is so much smaller and weaker than Russia’s that China could not signiªcantly re-
duce its vulnerability by alerting its intercontinental-range nuclear forces. Until China
deploys a robust arsenal of DF-31Amobile ICBMs (not the DF-31 missiles, whose range
is too short to effectively target the U.S. mainland14), it will be vulnerable to a U.S.
attack—alerted or not.
how much is enough for a robust nuclear deterrent?
Sauer and Wirtz argue that nuclear primacy will have little effect on international poli-
tics because the kind of attack we model could be easily deterred—even by a small nu-
clear arsenal. For Sauer, deterrence requires only “one accurate and invulnerable
nuclear weapon,” because it is hard to imagine a crisis over such important stakes that
a country would risk the loss of one major city. For Wirtz, the threshold for robust de-
terrence is even lower: “Even a remote possibility of retaliation” will deter “all but the
most risk-acceptant individuals.” We believe that history offers little justiªcation for
such optimism about the low risk tolerance of decisionmakers.
More research on the threshold for nuclear deterrence is needed,15 but a substantial
body of evidence—from the prenuclear and nuclear eras—calls into question the view
that minimal nuclear forces are sufªcient for robust deterrence, and that countries will
not risk losing a single city to achieve ambitious foreign policy goals.
The beginning of both world wars saw several countries accept staggering risks. By
invading France in 1914, German leaders gambled much more than the loss of a single
city. By war’s end, more than 2 million Germans were dead, their political system was
in turmoil, and the nation had been saddled with enormous reparations. But Germany
was not the only country to take an enormous gamble: Russia and Britain could have
opted out of the war when Germany invaded France, but they elected to ªght. Britain
suffered more than 3 million casualties, Russia more than 9 million, as well as a revolu-
tion and civil war.
The beginning of World War II teaches the same worrisome lesson. Germany aban-
doned caution by attacking Poland and France, and its subsequent invasion of the
Soviet Union was perhaps the most enormous military gamble of all time. By the end of
the war, many German cities were in ruins; a generation of German men was dead; and
the country was occupied and divided. But the Nazis were not the only risk takers in
the 1940s: the British gambled by refusing to make peace with the Germans after the
French had been knocked out of the war, and they suffered through the Blitz as a result.
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The Americans gambled by abandoning a strong offshore position to enter the ªght
against Germany on the European continent.16 Japan attacked the United States—a
country with several times its gross domestic product and population. That gamble cost
Japan dearly; by the end of the war, it had lost all of its overseas possessions, and the
United States had ªrebombed more than sixty Japanese cities, dropped atomic bombs
on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and occupied the country.
Evidence from the nuclear age also should undermine faith in the “minimalist
school” of deterrence. During the only prior period of nuclear primacy (during the
1950s), the U.S. strategy of massive retaliation called for an enormous nuclear attack on
the entire Communist bloc if a Soviet invasion of Europe appeared imminent. This was
no bluff; the strategy was debated and approved at the highest level. The nuclear weap-
ons and delivery systems for the mission were built and deployed, and military person-
nel were trained accordingly. Although U.S. leaders believed that the United States
could probably win the war without suffering nuclear retaliation against the U.S.
homeland, they were never certain. Nevertheless, they stuck to this strategy and ac-
cepted the risk of nuclear retaliation until U.S. primacy eroded. War plans changed not
because of the fear that a single bomb or two could possibly hit the United States, but
when U.S. leaders concluded that a portion of the Soviet force was expected to survive
and destroy several U.S. cities in response.17
The notion that deterrence will hold as long as countries face the mere possibility of
losing a single city—or even a few—is comforting, but it is not well supported by his-
torical evidence. Major wars always begin with at least one country taking a tremen-
dous risk, and these gambles are often bigger than the terrible prospect of losing a city.
why is the united states building nuclear primacy?
We argued in our article that the nature of U.S. nuclear improvements strongly indi-
cates that nuclear primacy is an intentional policy goal. Sauer and Lantis believe that
we mischaracterize U.S. motives. Sauer claims that the emergence of U.S. nuclear pri-
macy is the result of bureaucratic politics within the U.S. government, rather than a
strategic decision to acquire nuclear primacy. Lantis, on the other hand, agrees with us
that the United States is acquiring nuclear primacy through a set of “systematic and
purposeful” policies. He argues that nuclear primacy has not been a general goal of the
United States per se, but is a speciªc goal of key members of the George W. Bush
administration.
We are puzzled that Sauer sees no connection between U.S. efforts to build nuclear
primacy and the ofªcial U.S. foreign policy goal of locking in military primacy. Not
only has the Bush administration publicly declared that the United States seeks to
maintain military primacy over any peer competitor, but these words are matched by
deeds. Over the past decade, the United States has begun a major modernization of its
conventional military forces to expand its lead over all other countries. Why should we
assume that the parallel effort to improve U.S. nuclear capabilities is not part of the
overall national security strategy?
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Sauer implies that he is drawn to the bureaucratic politics explanation for the U.S.
achievement of primacy because it “also explain[s] the irrational overkill capacity de-
veloped by both superpowers during the Cold War.” But Sauer—like others—is led
astray in his analysis of current U.S. intentions because he misunderstands U.S. nuclear
doctrine during the Cold War. The U.S. nuclear force was structured to carry out several
potential missions during the Cold War, including: (1) retaliate against enemy cities af-
ter an enemy ªrst strike; (2) attack military targets in Europe to support NATO defen-
sive operations; and (3) destroy enemy nuclear forces in a U.S. preemptive strike.
Claims that the United States built an irrational “overkill” arsenal during the Cold War
are typically based on the false assumption that the ªrst mission—retaliating against
Warsaw Pact cities—was the only mission, and hence a few hundred nuclear weapons
were more than sufªcient. In fact, the third mission required so many weapons in the
latter stages of the Cold War that neither the United States nor the Soviet Union had
enough weapons to carry out a successful disarming attack. The point is that the enor-
mous Cold War arsenals, which are frequently presented as prima facie evidence for the
irrational nature of nuclear arms races, and which are used to argue that today’s nu-
clear policies are driven by bureaucratic battles, were not examples of “overkill” at all.
Strategic factors drove nuclear force requirements during the Cold War, and they ap-
pear to do so today as well.
Lantis’s effort to pin the pursuit of nuclear primacy on the ideas and individuals of
the Bush administration is contradicted by nearly six decades of U.S. strategic thought.
Two aspects of that history are important. First, there has been great continuity in U.S.
nuclear strategy since the dawn of the nuclear age, even though individuals and ad-
ministrations have come and gone. In the 1940s and 1950s, the United States strove to
acquire and then maintain nuclear primacy. After the United States lost its advanta-
geous position in the early 1960s, it spent the remainder of the Cold War striving—
albeit fruitlessly—to reacquire nuclear primacy. During the era of mutual assured de-
struction, every U.S. administration authorized the pursuit of better counterforce weap-
ons and strategies, searching in vain for a way to prevail in strategic nuclear war.18
Second, the most signiªcant change in U.S. nuclear policy during the Cold War was
caused by a shift in the nuclear balance of power, not the emergence of new actors or
ideas. U.S. national security strategy throughout the 1950s held that nuclear forces
would be the military tool of choice if vital U.S. interests were attacked. In the early
1960s, however, the United States abandoned its massive retaliation doctrine. The new
doctrine, which took on different labels over the subsequent decades of the Cold War,
was that the United States would respond to various levels of aggression with a range
of both conventional and nuclear options; an all-out nuclear attack would be launched
only as a last resort.
The shift in U.S. nuclear doctrine occurred just as the United States was losing its po-
sition of nuclear primacy. This was no mere coincidence. Since the mid-1950s, senior
ofªcials in Dwight D. Eisenhower’s administration grappled with the need to change
U.S. nuclear doctrine because the U.S. homeland was becoming vulnerable to Soviet
nuclear retaliation. Interestingly, when John F. Kennedy took ofªce and explored his
nuclear options at the peak of the Berlin crisis in 1961, the key question he asked the
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Joint Chiefs of Staff was whether the United States still possessed nuclear primacy—
that is, whether it could still launch a surprise nuclear disarming attack on the Soviet
Union without suffering nuclear retaliation.19 Indeed, the nail in the cofªn of the mas-
sive retaliation doctrine was not the rise of a new way of thinking about nuclear weap-
ons, but Kennedy’s September 1963 brieªng on U.S. nuclear war plans, which revealed
the end of the ªrst era of U.S. nuclear primacy.20
Of course, individuals and their ideas affect policy decisions. Even if objective shifts
in the balance of power carry the greatest causal weight in shaping national security
policy (as we believe they do), actors and institutions are a necessary transmission
belt—a belt that can be smooth or rough, rigid or elastic. The elevation of ideational
variables and individual actors as primary explanations for the course of U.S. nuclear
policy, however, is unsupported by the empirical record. Actors and ideas have come
and gone, but the pursuit of nuclear primacy has endured.
what is the utility of nuclear primacy?
We ended our article with a call for new research on the utility of nuclear primacy.21
Lantis, however, believes that the answer is already clear. He asserts that U.S. nuclear
primacy is worth very little because it yields almost no coercive leverage. Lantis
lists several instances in which other countries refused to accede to U.S. preferences
despite U.S. nuclear primacy. But his conclusion that primacy produces little beneªt is
premature.22
One reason to expect that nuclear primacy will yield coercive leverage in future
crises—particularly those involving high stakes for the United States—is that the prior
era of U.S. nuclear primacy gave Washington substantial bargaining leverage over the
Soviet Union. For example, U.S. leaders, reassured by the favorable balance of power,
forced Nikita Khrushchev to back down repeatedly during a series of crises over Berlin
from 1958 to 1961. In 1962 the Soviets were successfully coerced again—this time to re-
move their missiles from Cuba in humiliating fashion. Indeed, Soviet accounts of the
crisis suggest that it was their desire to escape from U.S. nuclear primacy—and the lev-
erage it had given the United States—that drove them to send Soviet missiles to Cuba
in the ªrst place.23
The United States may gain coercive leverage from nuclear primacy in future crises
as well. If the United States intervened militarily in a war between China and Taiwan,
U.S. ofªcials might privately caution Chinese leaders against alerting their strategic nu-
clear forces—warning that any steps to do so could trigger an immediate disarming
strike. The purpose of such a threat would be to keep the Chinese nuclear arsenal out of
the conºict, allowing the United States to defend Taiwan conventionally. A U.S. strat-
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egy along these lines would entail great risks, similar in some ways to the risks ac-
cepted by the United States during the Cuban missile crisis. But in the future, if U.S.
leaders feel that defending Taiwan is a key element in containing China, intervening in
the war and issuing nuclear threats may seem as sensible as Kennedy’s hard-line stance
seemed to U.S. leaders in 1962.
Finally, U.S. nuclear primacy may beneªt the United States more directly. America’s
most likely future adversaries may have nuclear weapons.24 In a war between the
United States and North Korea, for example, both Washington and Pyongyang might
be tempted to issue coercive nuclear threats. In the context of ongoing conventional
combat and nuclear threats, ºeeting intelligence about the location of North Korean nu-
clear forces, or signs that North Korea was readying its nuclear forces, would compel
the United States to consider launching a counterforce strike. Using nuclear weapons
would greatly increase the odds of success.
More broadly, it is impossible to know whether the United States will issue nuclear
threats during future crises, or whether it will ever attempt a counterforce strike against
an enemy’s nuclear arsenal. Although Lantis is correct that the United States has not
used its nuclear primacy in the post–Cold War world to coerce countries such as Iran or
North Korea to give up their nuclear programs, the United States may face even graver
threats in the future. In those crises—for example, in the midst of a shooting war with a
nuclear-armed Iran or North Korea—it is impossible to know how U.S. leaders will
weigh the risks of using nuclear coercion against the risks of not doing so. But given the
concerted efforts by U.S. adversaries to acquire nuclear weapons, and given the pres-
sures that may produce increased friction between China and the United States, we do
not dismiss the possibility of nuclear threats or nuclear war out of hand.
conclusion
None of our critics challenge the central empirical development that we highlight in
our article: U.S. counterforce capabilities vis-à-vis Russia and China have soared since
the end of the Cold War. Instead they raise important questions about the signiªcance
of nuclear primacy for the conduct of international politics.
This is precisely the debate that we intended to trigger, and we hope that this ex-
change of comments will be merely the ªrst round of that discussion. The results of this
extended debate will reveal a great deal about the nature of great power relations in the
twenty-ªrst century: most importantly, about the intensity of great power rivalries
among nuclear-armed states, especially the United States and China, and the likely role
of nuclear weapons in future crises and wars. Our answers to these questions provide a
window into whether this century will be more peaceful—or vastly more terrible—than
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